Grant v. State Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 39207 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-2-2014
Grant v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39207
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation

















BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CV 2011-759 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SIXTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY BANNOCK 
HONORABLE ROBERT C. NAFTZ 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8701 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 2 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................... 3 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 4 
I. The District Court Erred When It Declined To Appoint Counsel 
In Mr. Grant's Post-Conviction Action, Even Though He Had 
Made The Necessary Showing To Merit Appointment Of 
Counsel ................................................................................................... 4 
A. Idaho Should Recognize A Constitutional Right To Counsel 
In Initial-Review Collateral Challenges To The Effectiveness 
Of Trial Cousel ...................................................................................... 4 
1. The United States Supreme Court Has Already Rejected 
The State's First Argument; The Martinez Rule Is Clearly 
Applicable To Idaho ........................................................................ .4 
2. Martinez Only Determined That There Is A Separate 
Remedy In Federal Courts When States Deny Counsel 
In Initial-Review Collateral Proceedings; The Reasoning 
Underlying The Martinez Decision Is Directly Applicable 
To The Issue On Appeal In This Case ............................................. ? 
B. Mr. Grant Also Should Have Been Appointed Counsel 
Pursuant To Idaho Statute .................................................................. 13 
II. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Grant's 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Without Properly Considering 
The Undisputed Factual Allegations He Made In His Verified 
Petition And Affidavit In Support Of That Petition ..................................... 14 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 1? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 18 
Cases 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148 (2007) .............................................................. 15 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983) ............................................... 10 
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Counsel, 136 Idaho 63 (2001 ) ..................................... 9 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) ..................................................................... 9 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 (2004) ................................................. 13, 14 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007) ....................................................... 15 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) .................................................. 7,12 
Commonwealth v. Holmes, _ A.3d _,2013 WL 5827027, pp.20-21 (Pa. 
2013) ............................................................................................................... 11 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ........................................................... 7 
Gable v. Wengler, 2013 WL4097711, p.8 (D. Idaho August 13, 2013) .......... 6, 13 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) .......................................................... 9 
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005) ............................................................. 8 
Hall v. State, _ P.3d _, 2013 WL 6225673, pp.3-5 (Idaho 2013) ................. 11 
Holmes, _ A.3d _,2013 WL 5827027, p.20 ................................................. 11 
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) ....................... 9 
Loveland V. State, 141 Idaho 933 (Ct. App. 2005) .............................................. 14 
Martinez V. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) ................................................... passim 
Mata V. State, 124 Idaho 588 (Ct. App. 1993) ..................................................... 14 
Mata V. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430 n.13 (Tex. 2007) .......................................... 5 
Matthews V. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ........................................................... 9 
ii 
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801 (1992) ............................................................. 5 
Miller-EI v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. (2003) ........................................................... 1 0 
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) ............................................................. 10 
State v. Quixal, 70 A.3d 749 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) ...................... 11, 12 
State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546 (Ct. App. 1999) .................................................... 6 
State v. Shackelford, 2013 Opinion No. 107, pp.9-10 (2013) .............................. 12 
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437 (2008) ............................................................... 6 
Swaderv. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007) ......................................................... 13, 14 
Telford v. Nye, 154 Idaho 606 (2013) .................................................................... 9 
Tellez-Vasquez v. Smith, 2013 WL 4039462, p.3 (D. Idaho August 7,2013) .6, 13 
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) .................................................... .4, 5, 6 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Woodrow Grant appeals, claiming that, given the United States Supreme 
Court's recent opinions in Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013), and 
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), the district court's decision to deny his 
request to appoint post-conviction counsel violated his constitutional right to due 
process. The State responds that those decisions are distinguishable on two bases -
Idaho does not require ineffective assistance claims to be brought in post-conviction, 
and the cases were ultimately decided on federal law. The State's first argument was 
rejected in Trevino. The State's second argument is also meritless because the 
Supreme Court was only recognizing a remedy in federal habeas law when no attorney 
is appointed to assist a petitioner during his initial challenge to the effectiveness of trial 
counsel. The Supreme Court's discussion of the underlying problem - the deprivation 
of counsel during those "initial-review collateral proceedings" - is directly applicable to 
Mr. Grant's arguments on appeal, since that is the error of which he complains. Idaho's 
appellate courts should take this opportunity to answer the question left open by the 
Supreme Court's decisions and decide whether there is a due process right to counsel 
in initial-review collateral proceedings, or whether Idaho will procedurally default those 
claims without appointing counsel and allow the federal courts to decide these claims on 
their merits instead. 
Alternatively, Mr. Grant argued that the district court erred in denying his request 
for counsel based on Idaho's statutory provisions. The State's only responses to this 
alternative argument, is that Mr. Grant did not support his claims with admissible 
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evidence or that his allegations were refuted by other evidence in the record. The 
State's first argument is meritless, since Mr. Grant submitted verified and notarized 
assertions of fact, which are admissible as evidence. The State's second argument is 
similarly baseless since Mr. Grant is entitled to the appointment of counsel if his 
allegations present the possibility of a valid claim. Mr. Grant's verified allegations meet 
that standard. Therefore, the decision to not appoint counsel was erroneous. 
The State made similar responses to Mr. Grant's altemative argument that the 
district court erroneously summarily dismissed his petition for relief. The State's 
responses are unavailing in that context. If there is a genuine issue of material fact, an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary. The existence of evidence tending to contradict 
Mr. Grant's verified allegations of fact only creates a genuine issue of material fact. 
Thus, the district court's decision to summarily dismiss the petition for relief was in error. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Grant's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred when it declined to appoint counsel in Mr. Grant's 
post-conviction action, even though he had made the necessary showing to merit 
appointment of counsel. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Grant's petition 
for post-conviction relief without properly considering the undisputed factual 




The District Court Erred When It Declined To Appoint Counsel In Mr. Grant's Post-
Conviction Action, Even Though He Had Made The Necessary Showing To Merit 
Appointment Of Counsel 
A. Idaho Should Recognize A Constitutional Right To Counsel In Initial-Review 
Collateral Challenges To The Effectiveness Of Trial Counsel 
Mr. Grant contends that he has a due process right to counsel in the initial-review 
collateral proceeding, which in Idaho, is the post-conviction process, since he has 
presented a "substantial claim" based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Martinez, 132 Ct. at 1315; see also Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1918 (extending the scope 
of Martinez). The State responds that "Idaho does not categorically bar defendants 
from raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal," and further, that 
Martinez is inapplicable because it was ultimately decided on a question of federal 
habeas law. (Resp. Sr., pp.7-8.) The State's first argument is meritless in light of 
United States Supreme Court precedent, and its second argument ignores the fact that 
the Supreme Court only identified a remedy for the deprivation of counsel in cases such 
as this; the discussion of the underlying problem - the problem with depriving an 
indigent person of the assistance of counsel during initial-review collateral proceedings 
- is directly applicable here. 
1. The United States Supreme Court Has Already Rejected The State's First 
Argument; The Martinez Rule Is Clearly Applicable To Idaho 
The State argued that, since Idaho does not "categorically bar" claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel from being raised on direct appeal, the decision in 
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Martinez is inapplicable in Idaho. The State apparently fails to recognize that its 
contention has already been rejected by the United States Supreme Court: "a 
distinction between (1) a State that denies permission to raise the claim on direct appeal 
and (2) a State that in theory grants permission but, as a matter of procedural design 
and systematic operation, denies a meaningful opportunity to do so is a distinction 
without difference." Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921. Since the design of Idaho's post-
conviction system falls into the second category of states, the State's argument - that, 
since Idaho does not "categorically bar" claims of ineffective assistance of counsel from 
being raised on direct appeal, Martinez inapplicable to Idaho - has already been 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 
In Trevino, the Supreme Court considered the effect of the Texas post conviction 
procedures on the decision of whether to pursue claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel on direct appeal or in post-conviction. The Supreme Court noted that the 
Texas Courts had strongly suggested that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 
should be brought in post conviction, and not on direct appeal. Id. at 1919-20 ('''As a 
general rule' the defendant 'should not raise an issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal,' but rather in collateral review proceedings.") (quoting Mata v. 
State, 226 S.W.3d 425,430 n.13 (Tex. 2007)) (emphasis in original). Idaho's appellate 
courts have issued similar statements. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
noted that "a petition for post-conviction relief is the preferred forum for bringing claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel." Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992). 
The Court of Appeals explained further: 
The presentation of Saxton's ineffective assistance claims [on direct 
appeal] compels this Court to once again reiterate that it is usually 
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inappropriate to raise such an issue on a direct appeal from the judgment 
of conviction. This is so because claims of ineffective assistance regularly 
raise issues on which no evidence was presented at the defendant's 
trial. ... the trial on direct appeal rarely for review 
claims. 
State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has reaffirmed this admonition to not bring ineffective assistance claims 
on direct appeal, and indicated that doing so can have severe consequences for the 
defendant who does not heed the warning. See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 
(2008) (noting that, if a defendant pursues a claim of ineffective assistance in the direct 
appeal, he cannot then bring the same claim in post-conviction). Therefore, "as a 
matter of its structure, design, and operation," Idaho's judicial system "does not offer 
most defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trail counsel on direct appeal." Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921. In fact, the federal 
magistrate courts for the district of Idaho have already decided as much. See, e.g., 
Gable v. Wengler, 2013 WL4097711, p.8 (D. Idaho August 13, 2013) (unpublished 
opinion); Tellez-Vasquez v. Smith, 2013 WL 4039462, p.3 (D. Idaho August 7, 2013) 
(unpublished opinion). 
Like Texas, while there is a theoretical possibility that a claim of ineffective 
assistance can be raised in a direct appeal in Idaho, it is certainly not meaningful or 
practical to do so. Therefore, the rule from Martinez, as well as the underlying 
rationales, are applicable to the need for counsel in post-conviction challenges to the 
effectiveness oftrial counsel in Idaho. See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921. 
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2. Martinez Only Determined That There Is A Separate Remedy In Federal 
Courts When States Deny Counsel In Initial-Review Collateral 
Proceedings; The Reasoning Underlying The Martinez Decision Is Directly 
Applicable To The Issue On Appeal In This Case 
The State's other argument that Martinez is inapplicable to this case because 
the error was resolved by a remedy in federal habeas law - fails because Martinez only 
prescribed a remedy to an identified error. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319-20. The 
error identified was the deprivation of counsel during the initial challenge to the 
effectiveness of trial counsel. Although the Supreme Court did not reach the question of 
whether there is a constitutional right to counsel, its discussion on that point is directly 
applicable to the issue before this Court. 
The Martinez decision began by recognizing that there is a violation of the 
petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights when he is left without the assistance of 
counsel during his "one and only appeal." Id. at 1315 (citing Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353 (1963)). It also determined that there were several similarities between the 
direct appeal and a collateral challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel, and so, 
reaffirmed its determination that there may be "an exception to the constitutional rule 
that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings" when there is a challenge to 
the effectiveness of trial counsel. Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
755-56 (1991)). While it did not directly answer the question of whether such an 
exception exists, the United States Supreme Court nevertheless decided that, because 
the assistance of counsel is one of the "bedrock principles" of the judicial system, if the 
States are going to procedurally default collateral claims against the effectiveness of 
trial counsel without affording the petitioner the assistance of counsel, the federal courts 
would be empowered to consider the merits of those claims instead. Id. at 317-20. 
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The State's argument in this case focuses only on the fact that the remedy 
identified by the Supreme Court is available in the federal courts, not the state courts. 
(See generally Resp. Br., pp.7-B.) That position ignores the Supreme Court's analysis 
on the underlying error, which is just as critical as the mechanism the Supreme Court 
used to address that error. That is an error that not only exists in this case, but for 
which this Court can offer independent relief. Therefore, the decision in Martinez, 
particularly as it relates to the question of whether indigent petitioners need the 
assistance of counsel during the initial-review collateral proceedings challenging the 
effectiveness of trial counsel, is applicable to this case. As such, Idaho should decide 
whether it will recognize a due process right to counsel in initial-review collateral, or 
whether it will procedurally default claims in post-conviction without appointing counsel 
and allow the federal courts to decide them on their merits instead. 
The Supreme Court explained its reasoning for allowing such an extreme 
remedy: '''defendants pursuing first-tier review . . . are generally ill equipped to 
represent themselves .... '" Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (quoting Halbert v. Michigan, 
545 U.S. 605, 617 (2005)). The Supreme Court also pointed out, "[w]ithout the help of 
an adequate attomey, a prisoner will have similar difficulties vindicating a substantial 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim... . To present a claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial in accordance with the State procedures, then, a prisoner likely needs 
an effective attorney." Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that, "the initial-
review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counselor with ineffective counsel, 
may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given to a 
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substantial claim.,,1 Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. In reaching that conclusion, the 
United States Supreme Court made several observations which speak directly to the 
issue in this case. 
First, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the promise from Gideon: 
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is a bedrock principle in 
our justice system. It is deemed as an "obvious truth" the idea that "any 
person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Indeed, the right to 
counsel is the foundation of our adversary system. 
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963». 
Second, it pointed out that the decision to remove ineffective assistance claims to a 
collateral attack, while understandable and permissible, does have consequences 
because of this fundamental principle: "By deliberately choosing to move trial-
ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal process, where counsel is 
constitutionally guaranteed, the State significantly diminishes prisoners' ability to file 
such claims." Id. at 1318. The logical conclusion is that the constitutional protection 
cannot be avoided by the procedural expedient of requiring the claim to be brought by a 
different process. Compare Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (not allowing the 
1 By stating that the proceedings would "not have been sufficient" to present and 
prosecute the claim, the Supreme Court has impliedly invoked the principles of due 
process. Due process requires that a person have notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976); Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial 
Counsel, 136 Idaho 63,72 (2001). That opportunity to be heard must be meaningful in 
time, as well as in manner. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servo of Durham Gty, 452 U.S. 18, 
24-25 (1981); Telford v. Nye, 154 Idaho 606, 612 (2013). If the opportunity to be heard 
on the claim is insufficient, it is not meaningful in manner, and therefore, violates the 
constitutional protection of due process. In this regard, Mr. Grant stated that, without 
post-conviction counsel, "[i]t is almost impossible for him to present evidence in a form 
acceptable to this Court .... " (R., p.59.) Therefore, he requested counsel so that his 
evidence "can be presented to this Court in a proper and meaningful manner." 
(R., p.59.) As a result, the issue in this case is of constitutional proportions. 
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State to circumvent a constitutional protection (double jeopardy) by a mere procedural 
mechanism (charging two crimes instead of one based on meaningless distinctions)). 
The Supreme Court also recognized the petitioner particularly, the imprisoned 
petitioner - is set up to have his potentially-meritorious claims procedurally defaulted by 
the State without having the aid of counsel in the State proceedings. Id. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court determined that petitioners in that position - having sUbstantial claims of 
trial ineffectiveness procedurally defaulted without having the assistance of counsel -
would have a remedy through a federal habeas claim.2 Id. As such, the United States 
Supreme Court gave the states this choice: "elect between appointing counsel in initial-
review collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural default and raising a 
defense on the merits in federal habeas proceedings." Id. at 1320. Mr. Grant is asking 
this Court to answer the choice left to the states by the Supreme Court and determine 
that there is a right to counsel in these initial-review collateral proceedings. As the 
question regarding the need for assistance of counsel in initial-review collateral 
proceedings was central to the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez, its discussion of 
that issue is highly relevant to the issue now on appeal. 
2 According to the Supreme Court, a "substantial" claim, is one that the prisoner "must 
demonstrate that the claim has some merit." Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19. That 
standard requires the petitioner to '''sho[w] that reasonable jurists could debate whether 
(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different 
manner or that the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to 
proceed further."" Miller-EI v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting 
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 
893 n.4 (1983))). As the record shows that the issues presented were, at least, 
adequate to deserve further proceedings, Mr. Grant has demonstrated that his claim is 
a substantial one. (See App. Br., pp.15-38.) 
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Other courts are already taking the initiative on this issue and are incorporating 
the Supreme Court's rationale into their state procedures. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Holmes, _ A.3d _, 2013 WL 5827027, pp.20-21 (Pa. 2013); 
State v. Quixa/, 70 A.3d 749, 754-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). According to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "[Martinez] does establish a new federal habeas corpus 
consequence that jeopardizes both a Pennsylvania procedural default rule and the 
State's power and right to pass upon constitutional claims in the first instance. In short, 
this new equitable rule in practice can be just as coercive as the recognition of a new 
right. ... " Holmes, _ A. 3d _, 2013 WL 5827027, p.20. Therefore, it concluded: 
[I]f the federal courts deem Pennsylvania to be the equivalent of Arizona 
or Texas in its treatment of claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness on 
direct appeal, federal courts sitting in habeas corpus review of final 
Pennsylvania convictions may elect not to respect our "one full counseled 
appeal, one full counseled PCRA review" paradigm, at least as to claims 
of trial counsel ineffectiveness not raised by PCRA counsel, and may 
review such new claims on the merits, in the first instance, as an 
"equitable" matter. 
Id. at 20-21. As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took the opportunity to explain 
how the concerns identified in Martinez were addressed in its current state system, 
specifically noting that there was a rule-based right to counsel on initial PCRA petitions 
in Pennsylvania. Id. at 20; compare Hall v. State, _ P.3d _, 2013 WL 6225673, 
pp.3-5 (Idaho 2013) (finding that a capital case petitioner, who has a rule-based right to 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings, also has a right to effective assistance of 
counsel as assessed under the Sixth Amendment's framework). 3 
3 The decision in Hall was made pursuant to Idaho's current system, which does not 
recognize a constitutional right to post-conviction counsel. See Hall, _ P.3d _, 
2013 WL 6225673, pp.3-4. However, it does not appear that framework was challenged 
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Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court, upon examining Martinez, recognized 
as follows: "Although choosing not to decide the issue, the United States Supreme 
Court explained the rationale for finding a constitutional right to counsel in 'initial-review 
collateral proceedings .... '" Quixal, 70 A3d at 754. As a result, the New Jersey court 
determined there was "a State constitutional right to counsel when raising ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for the first time, whether raised on direct appeal or by way 
of PCR." Id. at 756. Not doing, so, the New Jersey court concluded, "would create the 
opportunity for an excusable procedural defect, permitting the late filing of a habeas 
petition, whenever defendant was not represented and counsel was not properly 
waived." Id. at 756 n.7. 
Idaho, too, should answer the Supreme Court's question and decide whether 
there is a due process right to counsel in initial-review collateral,4 or whether Idaho will 
in that case. See generally id extent of the right to counsel, specifically, whether such 
counsel had to be conflict-free. See id. 
3 Given the Supreme Court's framing of this question as "an exception to the 
constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings," in the 
context of the petitioner's challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel, see Marlinez, 
132 U.S. at 1315-17; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, this Court could limitthe scope of such 
a rule to cases where the petitioner is alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Compare State v. Shackelford, 2013 Opinion No. 107, pp.9-10 (2013) (deciding that the 
Supreme Court's decision recognizing the right to confrontation did not explicitly extend 
beyond the trial phase). 
. Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court was assessing the extent of the right to counsel, 
specifically, whether such counsel had to be conflict-free. See id. 
4 Given the Supreme Court's framing of this question as "an exception to the 
constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings," in the 
context of the petitioner's challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel, see Marlinez, 
132 U.S. at 1315-17; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, this Court could limit the scope of such 
a rule to cases where the petitioner is alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Compare State v. Shackelford, 2013 Opinion No. 107, pp.9-10 (2013) (deciding that the 
Supreme Court's decision recognizing the right to confrontation did not explicitly extend 
beyond the trial phase). 
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procedural/y default those claims and allow the federal courts to decide them on their 
merits instead. The federal magistrate courts in the District of Idaho have already 
recognized that Idaho's post-conviction procedures fall within the scope of the Martinez 
holding based on the decision in Trevino. See, e.g., Gable, 2013 WL 4097711, p.8; 
Tellez-Vasquez, 2013 WL 4038462, p.3. Thus, the question is, whether ineffective 
assistance claims will be considered by Idaho's courts first, or whether Idaho will allow 
the federal courts to do so instead. For the reasons discussed in Section I, A, 1, infra, 
that determination is accurate. Therefore, the discussion of the rationale for finding a 
constitutional right to counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings from Martinez is 
relevant to this appeal. The State's argument to the contrary is erroneous. 
Therefore, for the reasons discussed by the Supreme Court in Martinez, and as 
set forth in the Appel/ant's Brief, this Court should recognize the due process right to 
counsel during initial-review collateral proceedings. Further, it should reverse the 
district court's decision denying Mr. Grant the assistance of counsel on his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
B. Mr. Grant Also Should Have Been Appointed Counsel Pursuant To Idaho Statute 
The State's response in regard to Mr. Grant's alternate assertion - that he made 
a sufficient showing to merit appointment of counsel under Idaho's statute - is 
unremarkable, as it merely quotes the district court's rationale for not appointing 
counsel. The fact remains that Mr. Grant made a sufficient showing of the possibility of 
a valid claim (see App. Br., pp.13-28), as required by Idaho law. Swader v. State, 143 
Idaho 651, 654 (2007); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-93 (2004) 
(hereinafter, Charboneau I). His verified, notarized pleadings constitute admissible 
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evidence on this matter. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993); 
Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933,936 (Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, if true (which, at this 
stage in the proceedings, they are to be taken to be), they would entitle Mr. Grant to 
relief, and so the district court erred by not appointing counsel pursuant to Idaho's 
statute. Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 792-93; see also Swader, 143 Idaho at 654. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Grant's Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief Without Properly Considering The Undisputed Factual Allegations He 
Made In His Verified Petition And Affidavit In Support Of That Petition 
Mr. Grant contends, in the alternative, that the district court erred when it 
summarily dismissed his petition for relief. (App. Br., pp.28-38.) The State responds 
that Mr. Grant failed to support his claims with admissible evidence, or that other facts 
in the record disprove his allegations. (Resp. Br., pp.9-17.) The State is wrong 
because it does not properly apply the rules governing summary dismissal in the post-
conviction context. (Resp. Sr., pp.10-11, 13, 15-17.) The existence of contradictory 
evidence does not mean that the facts, construed in the light most favorable to the 
defendant, would not entitle Mr. Grant to relief. Rather, all the presence of such facts 
does is create a genuine issue of material fact, which means summary dismissal was 
inappropriate. This is the same mistake that the district court made. (See App. 
Sr., p.29.) Therefore, the State's arguments should be rejected and the district court's 
decision reversed. 
At the summary dismissal phase, it is not the district court's job to determine 
whether claims are disproved by other evidence in the record (i.e., by evaluating the 
responses to the guilty plea questionnaire), as the State believes. (Resp. Sr., p.11 
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evidence on this matter. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993); 
Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, if true (which, at this 
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conviction context. (Resp. Br., pp.10-11, 13, 15-17.) The existence of contradictory 
evidence does not mean that the facts, construed in the light most favorable to the 
defendant, would not entitle Mr. Grant to relief. Rather, all the presence of such facts 
does is create a genuine issue of material fact, which means summary dismissal was 
inappropriate. This is the same mistake that the district court made. (See App. 
Br., p.29.) Therefore, the State's arguments should be rejected and the district court's 
decision reversed. 
At the summary dismissal phase, it is not the district court's job to determine 
whether claims are disproved by other evidence in the record (i.e., by evaluating the 
responses to the guilty plea questionnaire), as the State believes. (Resp. Br., p.11 
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(,,[TJhe district court found upon review of [Mr.] Grant's guilty plea questionnaire that 
[Mr.] Grant understood his right to remain silent .... ").) The district court's job at the 
summary dismissal phase is to determine whether the claims present a genuine issue of 
material fact, because, if they do, an evidentiary hearing is required. See 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007) (hereinafter, Charboneau II). That 
means the district court's job at the summary dismissal phase is only to determine 
whether the claims in the verified pleadings, if taken to be true, would entitle the 
petitioner to relief. Id. When, and only when, "the alleged facts, even if true, would not 
entitle the applicant to relief," may the trial court summarily dismiss the claim.5 Id. 
(emphasis added); see also Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2007) (reaffirming 
that the courts "must take [the petitioner's] allegations as true, and determine whether a 
material fact exists that would entitle [the petitioner] to an evidentiary hearing"). At this 
stage of the proceedings, the district court must accept the petitioner's unrefuted 
assertions of fact as true, though it need not accept the legal conclusions the petitioner 
drew from those facts. 6 
5 This remains true, regardless of how bare or conclusory the allegations might be. See 
Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. The State's claim - that 
just because the allegations are bare or conclusory means summary judgment is 
appropriate - is inaccurate. (See, e.g., Resp. Br., p.17.) The question to be answered 
is whether, under those alleged facts, construed liberally in Mr. Grant's favor, he would 
be entitled to relief. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
Mr. Grant has met that standard. (App. Br., pp.15-39.) 
This rule extends to Mr. Grant's allegations of prejudice, which the State also 
claims were insufficient. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-11; 12, 14, 15.) However, the 
inferences from the facts in the record are to be "liberally construed in favor of the 
petitioner." Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 792 (emphasis added). When that rule is 
properly applied to Mr. Grant's assertions, there is sufficient allegation of prejudice to 
survive summary dismissal. (See App. Br., pp.15-39.) 
6 Many of Mr. Grant's factual allegations were unrefuted. (See, e.g., App., 
Br., pp.21-28.) Those facts must be accepted as true. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. The 
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In fact, in Baldwin, the Idaho Supreme Court demonstrated how this rule is 
supposed to be applied. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the facts 
surrounding Mr. Baldwin's claim that counsel should have filed a motion to suppress 
based on an invalid search were disputed. Id. at 156-57. However, despite the 
existence of those contradictory accounts, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded: "In 
either case, based on Baldwin's factual claims, the discovery of the heroin in the jacket 
pocket on the couch does not meet the stop and frisk exception .... A genuine issue of 
material of fact exists as to whether or not the detectives' search and seizure violated 
the Fourth Amendment." Id. (emphasis added). All the existence of those contradictory 
facts did was create the genuine issue of material fact; it did not justify the district 
court's decision to summarily dismiss those claims. See id. 
This is not how the district court applied that rule in this case, nor is it how the 
State advocates for application of the rule. The State and the district court would allow 
the mere existence of contrary facts (the statements in the guilty plea questionnaire, for 
example) to justify summary dismissal of Mr. Grant's claims. (See, e.g., Resp. Br., 11; 
R., p.98.) Nothing about Mr. Grant's responses in the questionnaire shows that, if the 
issues were resolved in Mr. Grant's favor, he would not be entitled to relief. As such, 
under a proper application of the rules governing summary dismissal, summary 
dismissal was inappropriate in this case. (App. Br., pp.37-39; see generally App. 
Br., pp.15-39.) Therefore, the district court's decision to summarily dismiss the petition 
was in error, and none of the State's arguments to the contrary hold merit. 
only question that remains for the courts in that situation is whether, under those facts, 
the petitioner would be entitled to relief. Id. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Because the district court erroneously denied his request for the assistance of 
post-conviction counsel, Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order 
denying him the assistance of counsel, as well as the order summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition, and remand this case for further proceedings. Additionally, 
because the district court erroneously summarily dismissed those claims, he 
respectfully requests this Court instruct that an evidentiary hearing be among those 
future proceedings. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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